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Abstract
Reputation building plays an important role in the evolution of reciprocal altruism
when the same individuals do not interact repeatedly because, by referring to repu-
tation, a reciprocator can know which partners are cooperative and can reciprocate
with a cooperator. This reciprocity based on reputation is called indirect reciprocity.
Previous studies of indirect reciprocity have focused only on two-person games in
which only two individuals participate in a single interaction, and have claimed that
indirectly reciprocal cooperation can not be established under image scoring reputa-
tion criterion where the reputation of an individual who has cooperated (defected)
becomes good (bad). In this study, we specifically examine three-person games, and
reveal that indirectly reciprocal cooperation can be formed and maintained stably,
even under image scoring, by a nucleus shield mechanism. In the nucleus shield,
reciprocators are a shield that keeps out unconditional defectors, whereas uncondi-
tional cooperators are the backbone of cooperation that retains a good reputation
among the population.
Key words: evolution of cooperation, indirect reciprocity, reputation, prisoner’s
dilemma game, n-person game
Indirect reciprocity based on social reputation has been considered as impor-
tant in the evolution of cooperation when same individuals do not interact
repeatedly [1]. Under indirect reciprocity, an individual who has cooperated
obtains returns from someone else, who knows indirectly through social repu-
tation that she is cooperative, in the community [2].
Nowak & Sigmund[3,4] have formalized a mathematical model of indirect reci-
procity as an evolutionary two-person giving game where the reputation of an
opponent affects the decision-making process. In their model, pairs of indi-
viduals interact only a few times and all individuals are informed about their
partners’ reputations. Moreover, in this model, image scoring is adopted as a
means to attach reputation. Under image scoring, those who cooperated (de-
fected) in the previous interaction become associated with a good (bad) repu-
tation. Especially, Nowak & Sigmund[4] have shown that, under image scoring,
an indirectly reciprocal strategy, called discriminating strategy (DIS), which
posits cooperation only with opponents who have good reputations, is not an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) but persistent in a population consist-
ing of DIS, unconditionally defective strategy (ALLD) and unconditionally
cooperative strategy (ALLC). (Note that this model does not include error
in implementation, i.e., an individual who intends to cooperate never fails to
cooperate.)
However, it has been shown that, in the two-person giving game that includes
error in implementation, DIS is neither persistent nor an ESS under image
scoring [5–9] 1 . The reason DIS is not an ESS is as follows: (1) DIS strate-
gists hurt each other in response to erroneous defections; (2) On the contrary,
ALLC strategists always intend to cooperate; (3) Therefore ALLC strategists
do not hurt others and maintain their good reputation, never to be hurt by
DIS strategists except erroneous defections; and (3) Consequently, in the pop-
ulation mostly consisting of DIS, the fitness of DIS is less than ALLC, so
the DIS population can be invaded by ALLC. Moreover, the fact that, in the
presence of error in implementation, DIS is not persistent under image scor-
ing has been shown by Panchanathan & Boyd[5]. They have demonstrated
that, considering neutral drift and perturbations of replication to decrease
DIS, the population of DIS invaded by ALLC is eventually taken over by
ALLD. In summary, in the two-person giving game including error in imple-
mentation, DIS can not evolve under image scoring. Many studies[5–11] have
claimed that the evolution of indirect reciprocity requires a more complicated
reputation criterion than image scoring.
Note that the above studies of indirect reciprocity have presumed dyadic inter-
action. However, in the real world, more than two individuals often take part
in a single interaction, e.g., sustainable use of common-pool resources and
predator inspection in fish etc. [12–14]. Therefore, we believe that not only
two-person games but also n(> 2)-person games [15–19] should be considered
as models of interactions in human societies or ecosystems.
The evolution of indirect reciprocity in n-person games has been investigated
by [20,21], who have shown that, in n-person games, DIS can be an ESS
under image scoring. However, regarding the evolutionary dynamics of indi-
1 In the absence of error, DIS is clearly not an ESS because ALLC is alternatively
the best reply to DIS.
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rect reciprocity in n-person games, they investigated a population comprising
only DIS and ALLD. Few studies have analyzed the evolutionary dynam-
ics in a population that also includes ALLC, though it has been shown that
ALLC plays an important role in two-person games [5]. In the present study,
expanding the model in [5], we analyze the evolutionary dynamics of indi-
rect reciprocity under image scoring in three-person games in a population
with ALLC, ALLD and DIS 2 . Moreover, we, as [5–7,9,10], address only the
case in the presence of implementation error because, in our daily life, we
sometimes make mistakes in implementation. The analyses reveal that indi-
rect reciprocity can be formed and maintained stably under image scoring in
three person games, although it has been shown that indirect reciprocity can
not in two-person games. Furthermore, in three-person games, the indirectly
reciprocal cooperation is maintained by a nucleus shield mechanism [22]. In
the nucleus shield, DIS coexists with ALLC and DIS is the shield that keeps
out ALLD, whereas ALLC is the backbone of cooperation that maintains a
good reputation among the population.
Evolutionary phenomena of indirect reciprocity in three-person games
Consider a population comprising infinitely numerous individuals. Each indi-
vidual in the population has a reputation that is either G (good) or B (bad).
Each generation includes a number of rounds. After the first round, each sub-
sequent round occurs with probability w (0¿ w < 1), i.e., the expected value
of the number of rounds in a generation is 1/(1− w).
In each round, all individuals are classified randomly into groups, each com-
prising three individuals; subsequently, they play a three-person prisoner’s
dilemma game in each group. In this game, each individual chooses either to
“cooperate (C)” or “defect (D)”. In this study, we assume that the payoffs
for a cooperator, V (C | k), and that for a defector, V (D | k), where k is the
number of opponents cooperating in the group, are calculated as a linear com-
bination of the payoffs against the two opponents in the two-person prisoner’s
dilemma game whose payoff is given in Table 1:
V (C | k)=
k
2
b− c (1)
V (D | k)=
k
2
b, (2)
2 We confirmed that the results in three-person games do not differ qualitatively
from those in more than three-person games.
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where b > c > 0. We have divided the linear combination of the payoffs by the
number of opponents (two). This form of payoff function is a natural expansion
of the two-person prisoner’s dilemma or giving game, which has been used in
several studies [17,16,24].
Table 1
Payoff of the two-person prisoner’s dilemma game (b > c > 0).
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C (b− c, b− c) (−c, b)
D (b, −c) (0, 0)
Moreover, implementation error is introduced with the parameter ² (0 < ²¿
1). With probability ², an individual who intends to cooperate fails to co-
operate because of a lack of resources, a mistake, etc. 3 . In other words, an
individual who intends to cooperate succeeds in cooperation with probability
²ˆ = 1− ² (0¿ ²ˆ < 1). In this study, we mainly use the probability of success:
²ˆ.
In this model, the reputation of opponents affects the decision-making pro-
cess. What is the mechanism for formation of reputation among individuals?
For this study, we adopt “image scoring” as a reputation criterion, which pre-
scribes how to judge the reputation of others based on the others’ past actions.
Under image scoring that was first used in [3,4], the reputation of each indi-
vidual is G at the beginning of each generation. Moreover, the reputation of
an individual who has defected becomes B and that of an individual who has
cooperated becomes G. Image scoring is a simple reputation criterion that re-
quires knowledge only of a past action of an opponent (first-order information)
(cf. the standing reputation criterion given in [11,5] requires the second-order
information). Furthermore, it has been reported that image scoring is widely
used in the real world [25–28].
Here, how does each individual choose an action based on the opponents’ rep-
utation? As in some previous studies [4,5,9,7], we consider three strategies:
the unconditionally cooperative strategy (ALLC) who always cooperates, an
unconditionally defective strategy (ALLD) who never cooperates, and the dis-
criminating strategy (DIS) who cooperates only when the other two partners
in the group have reputation G. The frequencies of these strategies are denoted
respectively as x1, x2, and x3.
3 As in [5,23], we do not consider errors that foster unintentional cooperation, i.e.,
an individual who intends to defect never fails to defect. Furthermore, objective or
subjective perception errors [6,10] are not considered.
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Fig. 1. Regions in (c/b, w) space where DIS is an ESS (²ˆ = 0.99). Region I: DIS
can not resist invasion by ALLC. Region II: DIS is an ESS. Region III: DIS can
not resist invasion by ALLD.
To investigate the evolution of the three strategies under the influence of
natural selection, we use replicator dynamics [29]
x˙i =xi(fi − f¯) (3)
on the invariant simplex S3 = {x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ R
3 : xi ≥ 0,
∑
xi = 1}. Here,
fi represents the fitness for strategy i (i = 1, 2, 3) and f¯ is the average fitness
in the population (the derivation of the fitness for each strategy is described
in Appendix A).
Evolutionary stability
First, we discuss the evolutionary stability of DIS. We show, in Fig. 1, the pa-
rameter space for the payoff function and for the probability of the subsequent
round, where DIS is an ESS in this three-person game. Region II in Fig. 1
is a parameter space, given by numerical calculation, in which f3 > f1 and
f3 > f2 when x3 = 1 and x1 = x2 = 0, i.e., DIS is an ESS. The figure shows
that, between a small and a large cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation, there
exists a range of the medium ratio where DIS is an ESS. Specifically, if the
cost-to-benefit ratio is large, DIS can not resist invasion by ALLD; moreover,
if the ratio is extremely small, DIS can not resist invasion by ALLC. Under
the medium cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation, DIS is an ESS. Moreover,
the range within which DIS is an ESS becomes larger as the probability that
5
each of the subsequent rounds occur, w, increases.
In summary, in three-person games, DIS can be an ESS under image scoring.
Note that it has already been shown that DIS is never an ESS in two-person
games[5].
Furthermore, clearly, ALLD is an ESS but ALLC is not.
Evolutionary dynamics
Here, we show the evolutionary dynamics of the frequency of the three strate-
gies. Moreover, from this point in our discussion, we fix w and ²ˆ respectively as
0.95 and 0.99. (We confirmed that the overall results do not change essentially
as far as 0¿ w < 1 and 0¿ ²ˆ < 1.)
Evolutionary dynamics along the ALLD-DIS edge
First, we show the dynamics along the ALLD-DIS edge ({x : x1 = 0})
in the simplex S3. On this edge, we find two stable equilibria by numerical
calculation: one at the ALLD corner and the other at the DIS corner; we
also find one unstable polymorphic equilibrium at a point between the two
corners, which we denote as F23. The evolutionary dynamics on the edge are
illustrated in Fig. 2(a). As that figure shows, if the cost to benefit ratio of
cooperation is large (about c/b > 0.8), there is no internal equilibrium and
the evolutionary dynamics always converge to the ALLD corner. On the other
hand, if c/b is sufficiently small (about c/b < 0.8), an unstable equilibrium
exists at F23. In this case, the evolutionary dynamics converge to the DIS
corner when the initial value of x3 is greater than F23, and converges to the
ALLD corner otherwise. In other words, F23 is a threshold frequency for DIS
to evolve. Moreover, the equilibrium at F23 approaches the ALLD corner as
c/b decreases, which indicates that the evolution of DIS becomes easier on
the ALLD-DIS edge as the cost to benefit ratio of cooperation decreases.
Evolutionary dynamics along the ALLC-DIS edge
Second, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics on the ALLC-DIS edge
in the simplex S3. Using numerical calculation, we illustrate the evolutionary
dynamics on the edge in Fig. 2(b). The figure shows that, on the ALLC-DIS
edge, an unstable internal equilibrium exists at F 1
13
and a stable internal equi-
librium at F 2
13
in addition to the ALLC corner and the DIS corner. Put more
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Fig. 2. (a) Bifurcation diagram of the equilibria on the ALLD-DIS edge: the solid
line indicates a stable equilibrium and the dashed line indicates an unstable equi-
librium (²ˆ = 0.99 and w = 0.95). (b) Bifurcation diagram of the equilibria on
the ALLC-DIS edge: a solid line indicates a stable equilibrium and a dashed line
indicates an unstable equilibrium (²ˆ = 0.99 and w = 0.95).
precisely, if the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is large (about c/b > 0.4),
no internal equilibrium exists, and evolutionary dynamics always converge to
the DIS corner. On the other hand, if the ratio is extremely small (about
c/b < 0.05), the stable equilibrium at F 2
13
alone exists and then evolutionary
dynamics always converge to F 2
13
. Under the medium cost-to-benefit ratio of
cooperation (about 0.05 < c/b < 0.4), two internal equilibria exist. In this
case, evolutionary dynamics converge to the DIS corner if there initially exist
sufficiently many DIS strategists; otherwise, it converges to the stable internal
equilibrium at F 2
13
.
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Fig. 3. The size of the basin of attraction for each of the three convergent points is
plotted as a function of cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation (²ˆ = 0.99 and w = 0.95).
The solid line indicates the size of the basin of attraction for DIS; the dash-dotted
line indicates that of attraction for F 2
13
; and the dashed line indicates that of attrac-
tion for ALLD. Each line represents an average value over 10000 simulation runs.
Region I: No equilibrium exists at F23, F
1
13
or F 2
13
. Region II: An equilibrium exists
at F23 and no equilibrium exists at F
1
13
or F 2
13
. Region III: Equilibria exist at F23,
F 1
13
and F 2
13
.
Furthermore, the figure shows that, as c/b decreases, F 1
13
approaches the DIS
corner and F 2
13
approaches the ALLC corner, which indicates that the evo-
lution of DIS becomes difficult as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation
decreases.
Global evolutionary dynamics
Next, we show the global dynamics of the frequency of the three strategies
using numerical simulations.
In Fig. 3, we show, as a function of cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation, c/b,
the probability that evolutionary dynamics converges to each convergent point
using 10000 numerical simulation runs starting at a random initial frequency
of the strategies. That probability is equivalent to the size of the basin of
attraction. The figure shows that there exist three convergent points of the
evolutionary dynamics: the DIS corner; the ALLD corner; and an equilibrium
at F 2
13
where DIS and ALLC coexist.
Figure 3 shows that, if c/b > 0.8 (region I in the figure), then all the dynamics
converge to the ALLD corner. In this case, equilibria do not exist at F23, F
1
13
or
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Fig. 4. Evolutionary dynamics of the frequency of the three strategies (²ˆ = 0.99 and
w = 0.95): circles represent equilibria. (a) c/b = 0.5. (b) c/b = 0.2. (c) Evolutionary
dynamics in the vicinity of the equilibrium at F 2
13
given in (b).
F 2
13
(see Fig. 2) and the ALLD corner is the only attractor of the evolutionary
dynamics.
Evolutionary dynamics converge either to the DIS corner or to the ALLD
corner depending on the initial frequency of the strategies if 0.4 < c/b < 0.8
(region II in Fig. 3). The evolutionary dynamics for this case are illustrated
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in Fig. 4(a). In this case, an equilibrium exists at F23, but no equilibria exist
at F 1
13
or F 2
13
(see Fig. 2). Moreover, both convergence points, the DIS corner
and the ALLD corner, are asymptotically stable. The dynamics converge to
the DIS corner when sufficiently numerous DIS exist initially, and to the
ALLD corner otherwise. Furthermore, the size of the basin of attraction for
DIS increases monotonically as c/b decreases.
The evolutionary dynamics converge to one of the three convergence points
if c/b < 0.4 (region III in Fig. 3). The evolutionary dynamics for this case
are illustrated in Fig. 4(b), which shows that the DIS corner and the ALLD
corner are asymptotically stable. On the other hand, the equilibrium at F 2
13
is not asymptotically stable 4 : even if perturbations occur, the dynamics at
the equilibrium eventually revert to the equilibrium. In other words, when
perturbations to decrease the frequency of DIS occur at F 2
13
, the frequency of
ALLD increases temporarily; however, after some time, the ALLD is driven
out by DIS, and the coexistence of DIS and ALLC is thereby restored. In
this sense, the equilibrium at F 2
13
is robust.
Compared with the dynamics under image scoring in two-person games [5], the
dynamics in three-person games have the following two remarkable features.
First, evolutionary dynamics can converge to the DIS corner in three-person
games, although that never occurs in two-person games. This convergence re-
sults from the difference in evolutionary stability of DIS under image scoring
between two-person and three-person games. As described previously, under
image scoring, DIS can be an ESS in three-person games, whereas DIS can
not in two-person games [5]. Second, in three-person games, the equilibrium
at F 2
13
where DIS and ALLC coexist is robust in that, if perturbations to de-
crease the frequency of DIS occur, the dynamics at the equilibrium eventually
revert to the equilibrium. On the other hand, in two-person games, the equi-
librium at which DIS and ALLC coexist is not robust, and the dynamics at
the equilibrium converge eventually to the ALLD corner if the perturbations
occur[5,7,9]. That is, under image scoring, a society in which DIS and ALLC
coexist can be maintained in three-person games, but cannot be maintained
in two-person games. In other words, indirectly reciprocal cooperation can
be formed and maintained, even under image scoring in three-person games,
although it cannot be in two-person games.
4 The equilibrium at F 2
13
is not asymptotically stable but Lyapunov stable because
loops beneath the equilibrium become smaller as approaching the equilibrium (see
Fig. 4 (c)).
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Discussion
In this study, we investigated the evolution of indirect reciprocity under image
scoring in three-person games. We have particularly examined the case in
the presence of error in implementation. Those analyses have revealed that
indirect reciprocity can be formed and maintained under image scoring in
three-person games, although results of previous works[5,7,9] have shown that
indirect reciprocity can not in two-person games.
In two-person games, DIS is not stable against invasion by ALLC and co-
exists with ALLC as a stable polymorphism, but the polymorphism is vul-
nerable to perturbations (e.g. neutral drift or mutation)[5,7]. In a population
dominated by DIS strategists, a rare ALLC strategist achieves higher fit-
ness because the invading ALLC strategist always intends to cooperate and
thereby maintains a good reputation, never to be hurt by the incumbent DIS
strategists except for erroneous defections, whereas the DIS strategists hurt
each other in retaliation for others’ erroneous defections. Therefore, initially
a few ALLC strategists can increase their population in the DIS population.
On the other hand, a few DIS strategists can invade the ALLC population
because the invading DIS strategist can refuse to cooperate but still receive
cooperation by the incumbent ALLC strategists. Consequently, the frequency
of DIS and ALLC converges to a stable polymorphic equilibrium. However,
if a non-adaptive process such as mutation or neutral drift were introduced,
ALLD strategists would be able to invade the stable polymorphic equilibrium.
Therefore, ALLD is the only long-term viable outcome.
In three-person games, as we have shown in this paper, phenomena different
from those in two-person games are observed.
First, DIS is an ESS if the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is in some inter-
mediate range, i.e., DIS can resist the invasion by both ALLD and ALLC.
The remarkable point is that DIS is stable against invasion by ALLC. In
three-person games, a few invading ALLC strategists who retain their good
reputation, mostly belong to a group with two incumbent DIS strategists,
who lose their good reputations because of retaliatory defections, in the popu-
lation dominated by DIS. In this group, a DIS strategist defects in response
to the bad reputation of the other DIS strategist even if the ALLC strategist
has a good reputation. That is, a few invading ALLC strategists can not avoid
being caught in the retaliatory defection in three-person games. Therefore, the
invading ALLC strategist cannot attain higher fitness than incumbent DIS
strategists.
Second, in three-person games, there exists a polymorphic equilibrium at
which DIS coexists with ALLC, as in two-person games. However, unlike two-
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person games, the polymorphic equilibrium is robust even if a non-adaptive
process, such as mutation or neutral drift, is introduced. In terms of the evo-
lution of cooperation, the polymorphic equilibrium is more important than
the DIS equilibrium because, in the DIS equilibrium, the frequency of DIS
with good reputation goes to zero over time: no DIS cooperates. Only the
polymorphic equilibrium can attain high-level cooperation. (In Appendix B,
we show the frequencies of cooperation on the simplex S3 by density plot.)
At the polymorphic equilibrium, cooperation is maintained by an interesting
role-sharing that occurs between DIS and ALLC. Specifically in this role-
sharing, ALLC retains the good reputation of DIS so that cooperation contin-
ues. (Note that, without ALLC, DIS strategists hurt each other in response to
erroneous defection; then all DIS strategists come to defect in the long run.)
On the other hand, DIS provides protection against invasion by ALLD in
role-sharing. This role-sharing is reminiscent of some findings from the previ-
ous model of direct reciprocity that involves a so-called nucleus-shield [22]. In
our model, DIS is the shield that keeps out ALLD, while ALLC is the back-
bone of indirect reciprocal cooperation that maintains the good reputation of
the population.
Many theoretical studies of two-person games [5–10] have concluded that indi-
rectly reciprocal cooperation can not be established under image scoring. They
have stated that people should use more complicated reputation criteria (e.g.
standing [30]) to establish cooperation. However, which reputation criterion
people actually use, image scoring or more complicated one, remains a con-
troversial issue in experimental studies[26,31]. Regarding two-person games,
some experimental studies of human subjects [25,26] have demonstrated that
image-scoring is widely used. Nonetheless, other experimental studies have
shown that human beings use more complicated reputation criteria than im-
age scoring[31]. Based on the results of this study, we claim that indirect re-
ciprocal cooperation can be established even under image scoring when three
individuals interact in a single group. This conclusion might suggest the pos-
sibility that experimental studies of indirect reciprocity in three-person games
find a very different result from that in two-person games.
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A Appendix A
Here we derive the fitness for each strategy, which is defined as her expected
total payoff during a generation. The payoff for an individual in a round is
determined by the probability that the focal individual cooperates and by the
probability that an opponent of the focal individual cooperates (see eq. (1)
and (2)).
Because ALLD never cooperates and ALLC always intends to cooperate, the
respective probabilities that ALLD and ALLC cooperate are 0 and ²ˆ. Further-
more, DIS intends to cooperate only when the two opponents have reputation
G. Let g(t) be the frequency of individuals with reputation G among the whole
population at round t. Then, the probability that DIS cooperates at round t
is ²ˆg(t)2. Moreover, we represent the frequency of individuals with reputation
G at round t among ALLC, ALLD and DIS strategies, respectively, as g1(t),
g2(t) and g3(t). In this case, g(t) = g1(t)x1+g2(t)x2+g3(t)x3. At the first round,
all individuals have reputation G; therefore, g(1) = g1(1) = g2(1) = g3(1) = 1.
Because ALLC always intends to cooperate, g1(t) = ²ˆ for t ≥ 2; because
ALLD always defects, g2(t) = 0 for t ≥ 2. Furthermore, because DIS intends
to cooperate at round t− 1 with the probability ²ˆg(t− 1)2, g3(t) = ²ˆg(t− 1)
2
for t ≥ 2, and so g3(2) = ²ˆ and lim
t→∞
g3(t) = (1−2²ˆ
2x1x3−
√
1− 4²ˆ2x1x3)/2²ˆx
2
3
,
i.e., the frequency of individuals with reputation G among DIS approaches
the above value over time.
On the other hand, an opponent of the focal individual intends to cooperate
only in the following two situations: (1) the opponent has the ALLC strategy,
the probability of which is x1; and (2) the opponent has the DIS strategy,
and both the focal individual and the other opponent have reputation G, the
probability of which is gi(t)g(t)x3, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Therefore, the expected payoff at round t for the three strategies, ALLC,
ALLD and DIS, represented respectively as f1(t), f2(t) and f3(t) are
f1(t)= ²ˆb[x1 + g1(t)g(t)x3]− ²ˆc, (A.1)
f2(t)= ²ˆb[x1 + g2(t)g(t)x3], (A.2)
f3(t)= ²ˆb[x1 + g3(t)g(t)x3]− ²ˆcg(t)
2. (A.3)
The fitness for strategy i (i = 1, 2, 3), which is defined as its expected total
payoff during a generation is
fi =
∞∑
t=1
wt−1fi(t). (A.4)
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Fig. 5. Average frequencies of cooperation in a generation in the simplex S3 (²ˆ = 0.99
and w = 0.95): the frequencies are illustrated as gray scale (light is high and dark
is low) for each point in the simplex. The point at F 2
13
in this figure indicates the
equilibrium at F 2
13
in Fig. 4 (b).
We can not get the exact calculation of f2 and f3. Therefore, we obtain those
values approximately by numerical calculation fi =
∑
T
t=1
wt−1fi(t). This ap-
proximation does not change the results essentially as far as T is sufficiently
large, because 0¿ w < 1 and fi(t) is bounded. Throughout this study, we set
T = 10000.
B Appendix B
We show the density plot of the frequencies of cooperation on the simplex
S3 in Fig. 5. As the figure shows, the frequency of cooperation at the DIS
equilibrium is very low, but the frequency at the polymorphic equilibrium
where DIS coexists with ALLC is very high.
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